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Executive Summary
Many business, academic, and scientific groups have recommended that the
Congress substantially increase R&D spending in the near future. President
Bush’s American Competitiveness Initiative calls for a doubling of spending
over the next decade in selected agencies that deal with the physical sciences,
including the National Science Foundation. We consider the rationale for gov-
ernment R&D spending in the context of globalization and as an investment in
human capital and knowledge creation with gestation times far longer than fed-
eral funding cycles. To assess the impact of a large increase in R&D spending on
the science job market, we examine the impact of the 1998–2003 doubling of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget on the biomedical sciences. We find
that the rapid increase in NIH spending and ensuing deceleration created sub-
stantial adjustment problems in the market for research and failed to address
long‐standing problems with scientific careers that are likely to deter many
young people from choosing a scientific career. We argue that because research
simultaneously produces knowledge and adds to the human capital of re-
searchers, which has greater value for young scientists because of their longer
future career life span than for older scientists, there is a human capital–based
reason for giving awards to younger researchers relative to equally compe-
tent older researchers.
In his 2006 State of the Union Address President Bush announced the
American Competitiveness Initiative—a program that promised to
spend substantial federal moneys to redress perceived U.S. weaknesses
in science and technology. One of the centerpieces of the initiative was a
commitment to double basic R&D spending over the next decade at the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy’s
Science Core programs, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Another component called for $4.6 billion in R&D tax in-
centives, intended to induce greater R&D spending by private firms.
Much of the president’s proposal was based on the National Academy
of Sciences’ 2006 Gathering Storm report, which called for large increases
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keep the United States in the forefront of science and technology.
Congress responded to the Competitiveness Initiative by authorizing
increased R&D spending, indicatingt h a ti td e s i r e dt oi n c r e a s eR & D
support. But Congress did not appropriate the funds. Failure to appro-
priate the money reflected partisan disagreements in Washington and
the greater importance of other budgetary and political considerations.
The result was a modest change in federal spending for R&D in the
physical sciences and stagnant federal support of R&D overall that re-
duced spending in real terms. Congress did, however, extend tax incen-
tives for corporate R&D spending.
Between 2000 and 2006, many studies and reports called for improve-
ments in the country’s capacity in scientific and technological activity
(Freeman 2006) by increasing R&D spending and investing more in
science and engineering education. The call for increased resources
for science and engineering was based on a widespread belief that “so-
lutions to many of the challenges facing society have their roots in our
scientific understanding, where technology increasingly drives the glo-
bal economic engine, and where many other nations are gaining rapidly
in scientific and engineering capabilities” (NSF 2007a, 1). Business lead-
ers, particularly in high‐tech sectors, were worried about increased for-
eign competition and the decline of comparative advantage in the
R&D‐intensive sectors of the economy. The science community decried
a decreased rate of funding basic research proposals that “may be nega-
tively impacting the academic research community, resulting in increased
workload and diminished S&E capacity” (1). The National Institutes of
Health (NIH) complained that it could not support as many high‐quality
research proposals as in the past, and the NIH and NSF reported that
their peer review systems were overburdened with a growing number
of research proposals. The military and defense establishment, whose
hires are often limited to U.S. citizens, feared that not enough citizens
and residents were choosing science and engineering careers.
1
Given that most analysts recognized that the career incentives for en-
tering science and engineering were too low to attract more U.S. stu-
dents, nearly all studies favored educational initiatives to improve
science in schools as well as spending increases to boost demand for
scientists and engineers. The National Academy of Sciences’ Board of
Life Sciences recommended that NIH “take steps to provide PostDocs
and early‐career investigators with more financial support for their
own research and establish programs for new investigators and staff
scientists among other mechanisms” (NAS 2005, 1). The American
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funding the sciences called for funding directed at young investigators
and at risky projects that could have high payoffs.
The widespread support for increasing the U.S. investment in science
and engineering, particularly in the physical sciences, makes it likely
that in the near future Congress will substantially boost R&D spend-
ing.
2 There are precedents for a surge in R&D spending to meet per-
ceived national opportunities or needs. In 1998 a bipartisan coalition
in Congress pressed the Clinton administration to increase the R&D
budget substantially, with particular emphasis on the NIH. The coali-
tion favored a doubling of NIH spending over 10 years, but the admin-
istration chose an even more rapid increase—a doubling in the budget
over the next 5 years. In 2003 the Bush administration completed the
doubling but then kept the budget roughly stable in nominal terms.
Earlier, the Soviet Sputnik spurred a huge increase in federal R&D
spending between 1956 and 1962. There have been smaller bursts of fi-
nancial support for particular programs deemed of special national in-
terest in given time periods such as the War on Cancer, Apollo, and the
Nano‐Technology Initiative.
How do large concentrated increases in R&D spending affect the
market for research and the careers of scientists and engineers? How
might the government best structure an increase to produce a bigger
sustainable research system? Will increased spending improve the job
market for young scientists and engineers and attract more Americans
into the fields as many hope it will do?
This paper examines these questions. It reviews some of the evidence
on the state of science and engineering that motivated the Competitive-
ness Initiative and the diverse reports that called for increased R&D
spending. Then it assesses the doubling of the NIH budget from 1998
to 2003 and the ensuing deceleration in spending, focusing on the ad-
justment problems that result from rapid acceleration and deceleration
of spending. The NIH doubling experience provides a warning sign of
what might happen in the future to the physical sciences if funding in-
creases for the NSF and the other agencies that support the physical
sciences in the same manner that funding increased for NIH.
On the basis of this analysis, we consider ways for the federal govern-
ment to boost R&D spending more efficiently in the future. Our main
conclusions are as follows:
1. Increased R&D spending may not by itself resolve problems with the
Americanscientificresearchendeavor.Morefundsmaybenecessary but
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place basic research onto a long‐term sustainable growth path. The way
the funds are allocating and the time pattern of changes in funding are
also important.
2. One‐time surges in spending, which produce a deceleration after the
surge, have sizable adjustment costs. Instead of making “doubling”
spending a goal, policy makers could determine a desired ratio of
R&D to GDP and increase funding smoothly to attain that goal. Agen-
cies and universities could use “bridge funding” or stabilization poli-
cies to buffer research activity from rapid changes in spending.
3. The response of researchers to the incentives built into the number
and size of research grants offered determines the effects of spending
initiatives on research activity. When a funding agency increases the
number and value of research grants, researchers submit more propos-
als, increasing the amount of research, along a supply curve. When an
agency reduces the number of awards, in the short run researchers also
respond by making multiple submissions. This stresses the peer review
process and stability of the research market. Funding agencies have to
balance changes in the number and value of grants carefully to reduce
the adjustment costs of changes in budgets.
4. Viewing research grants as investments in the human capital of the
researcher as well as in the production of knowledge, funding agencies
could support proposals by younger researchers over equivalent propos-
als of older researchers. The reason is that younger researchers, by which
we mean those with 20 or so years of likely future research careers, are
more likely to use their increased human capital in future research be-
cause they have a longer career ahead of them than older researchers
close to retirement.
I. Understanding the Concern
The Background
The U.S. share of science and engineering activity around the world is
declining (see table 1 for an overview). This decline is inevitable as the
rest of the world catches up to the United States in higher education
and R&D. In 1970, with just 6% of the world’s population the United
States had 30% of the world’s college students and graduated about
40% of science and engineering PhDs. By 2005, as countries around
the world invested heavily in higher education, the U.S. share of college
Freeman and Van Reenen 4enrollments had fallen to 13%. The U.S. share of the world’s science and
engineering graduates is, moreover, below its share of all graduates be-
cause science and engineering attract larger proportions of students over-
seas than in the United States. At the doctorate level, the U.S. share of
science and engineering degrees fell to 20% in 2000 and is expected to
reach 15% in 2010. The United States contributed about half of the world’s
R&D spending in the 1970s, but this dropped to about a third by 2003.
Partly in response to the growth of scientific and engineering talent
around the world, the multinational firms that undertake most indus-
trial R&D increasingly invest in R&D outside the United States as well
as in the United States. The large number of science and engineering
graduates in China and India combined with the lower wages in those
countries makes them attractive sites for multinational R&D facilities.
In 2004 China reported that multinationals had established over 750
R&D facilities, whereas in 1990 they had none. In 1991 the United States
spent 13 times as much on R&D as China. In 2003 it spent only 3.4 times
as much (Freeman 2006).
About 60% of basic research in the United States is conducted in uni-
versities, largely funded by the federal government.
3 The major federal
funding agencies for basic research in the physical sciences are the NSF,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and National Institute of
Standards and Technology; the NIH is the main funder of basic research
Table 1
Declining U.S. Shares of World Science and Engineering Activity
Measure of Activity Early Period Later Period
College enrollments 30% (1970) 13% (2005)
Science and engineering
undergraduate degrees ∼20% (1970) ∼9% (2004)
PhDs in science and
engineering granted 40% (1970) 15% (2010)
R&D ∼50% (1970) ∼35% (2003)
ACS chemical abstracts 73% (1980) 40% (2003)
All science articles 39% (1988) 29% (2005)
All citations 36% (1992) 30% (2002)
Sources: College enrollments: Freeman (2008), based on tertiary enrollments from United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Institute for Statistics (http://
stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId‐167, table 14), Mon-
treal. Science and engineering undergraduate degrees: 2004 from NSF (2008, app. table
2‐37), excluding social sciences; 1970 estimate from Freeman (2008). PhDs granted, R&D,
and American Chemical Society chemical abstracts: Freeman (2006). Science articles: NSF
(2007b, 2008, table 5‐34). Citations: NSF (2008, app. table 5‐38), where 2002 refers to articles
written in 2001–3 cited by 2005 articles (%); 1992 refers to 1991–93 articles cited by 1995
articles.
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nonmedical fundamental research at U.S. colleges and universities.
From 1990 to 2006 the share of R&D funded by the federal government
fell from 40.5% to 28.4%. Compared to GDP, federal R&D fell from
0.112% to 0.073%.
4
As the U.S. share of scientists and engineers and R&D worldwide has
trended downward, so too has the U.S. share of scientific publications
and citations. Data from the Chemical Abstracts Services show that in
1980 the United States had 73% of papers in the field, whereas in 2003
U.S. researchers had only 40% of the papers (Freeman 2006). The U.S.
share of science articles published fell from 39% in 1988 to 29% in 2005,
and the U.S. share of citations dropped from 36% of articles written in
1992 to 30% of articles written in 2002.
Given the demography of the world, the United States cannot main-
tain the dominance in science and technology that it enjoyed in the last
half of the twentieth century. It can, however, be a leading center of ex-
cellence of basic R&D if it invests more in R&D and makes science and
engineering careers attractive to young Americans and to immigrant
scientists and engineers.
Why Care?
The calls for increased federal spending on basic science and related
policies are motivated by economic and national security concerns.
On the economic front, there is widespread belief that the United States
is more likely to maintain production and jobs in high‐tech sectors if the
country pioneers scientific advances than if other countries pioneer
those advances. The growth of high‐tech employment in Silicon Valley
and in university‐based locations of scientific excellence suggests that
innovation, production, and employment in high tech occur largely in
areas with excellence in science.
5 Since leading‐edge industries have the
fastest long‐run productivity growth, pay higher wages to most work-
ers,
6 and offer spillovers of knowledge to other sectors, there is global
competition for these industries. Advocates of increased federal spend-
ing for basic R&D also argue that the more basic R&D performed in the
United States, the more likely it is that the country will attract industry
in research‐intensive sectors.
7
To take the argument a step further, many analysts note that the
United States' comparative advantage in global markets lies in high‐tech,
research‐intensiveindustries.Were the UnitedStates to losecomparative
advantage in those sectors, it would have to sell goods or services with
Freeman and Van Reenen 6lower technological content on the global market and compete with
countries with similar technology and low wages. The gains from trade
would lessen and wages would fall for American workers.
In terms of national security, proponents of increased U.S. investment
in science and engineering note that current “technologies for counter-
terrorism and homeland security are outcomes of earlier US invest-
ments in science, technology, and education” (Jackson 2003, 1) and
argue that science and technology offer the best defense against terror-
ist threats. The National Security Agency and various Defense Depart-
ment laboratories and contractors hire only U.S. citizens for critical
research tasks, which makes them particularly sensitive to the supply
of citizens in the relevant fields. The science and engineering workforce
in security areas has become top‐heavy with older workers, which will
create large replacement demands for citizen researchers.
A More Critical Assessment
Economic analysis provides some support for these arguments but also
offers some caution about how much weight to place on them. For rea-
sons of knowledge spillovers and economic competitiveness, investments in
basic research can pay off in ways that justify major public invest-
ments.
8 But to determine whether the United States is currently at, be-
low, or above the socially optimal level of public spending on basic
research is not an easy task. In a global economy, where other countries
are also investing in basic and applied research and where major U.S.‐
owned firms have become “global firms,” it has become more difficult
to assess the optimal level of public support for basic research than it
was in the past.
Knowledge Spillovers
Economists focus on knowledge externalities as the main reason for
public spending on research. Because of the public‐good nature of
knowledge, the benefits of research “spill over” to other agents and are
onlypartiallycapturedbythepersonorfirmthatoriginallyinvestedinit.
The result is that the private market will invest less in R&D than is so-
cially optimal, giving a strong rationale for government spending on
R&D in various ways. A large body of evidence shows that knowledge
spillovers are statistically and economically significant.
9 Such spillovers
are the foundation of modern growth theory (e.g., Romer 1989; Aghion
and Howitt 1990).
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aries,
10 the spread of higher education and transfer of technology by
multinational firms from advanced countries have made R&D more in-
ternational than ever before (Freeman 2006). If knowledge spread in-
stantly across boundaries, the rationale for government subsidies to
research would decrease in favor of global subsidies.
11 In reality there
is some localization or “stickiness” to research so that the country or
region within a country that does the research disproportionately ben-
efits from the spillover. But modern communication such as the Internet
and falling transport costs appear to have reduced this advantage (Griffith,
Lee, and Van Reenen 2007), weakening the spillover justification for
R&D subsidies. By a similar logic, the growth of an international labor
market for scientists has meant that many U.S. universities attract post-
docs and faculty from the international market, reducing the necessity
of using U.S. taxpayers’ money to train the next generation of scientists
and engineers.
Economic “Competitiveness”
Firms compete in the marketplace: when one firm does better, it is often
at the expense of other firms. Countries do not “compete” in the same
sense. While there are situations in which one country’s gain is another
country’s loss (see, e.g., Baumol and Gomory 2004), the benefits of
R&D‐induced or other innovations that improve productivity in one
country are likely to flow to persons in other countries as well. Given
the public‐good nature of R&D and trade in goods and services, the
expansion of modern scientific and technological activity in the world
should improve the lives of people worldwide regardless of the loca-
tion of the innovative activity. If a medical scientist in China, India, the
United Kingdom, or anywhere else finds a cure for cancer, we will all
benefit. If a German innovation lowers the price of household goods
and services, we will all benefit. If scientific advances and innovations
overseas lead foreign firms to set up production facilities in the United
States or if U.S. firms exploit overseas innovations to produce in the
United States, this will create jobs as well as better products.
At the same time, countries can use publicly funded R&D to boost
their strategic position in some sectors, potentially creating comparative
a d v a n t a g et h a tw o u l dn o te x i s tw i t h o u tp u b l i cs u p p o r t( e . g . ,i nt h e
commercial airline market). Strategic trade theory has models in which
R&D subsidies canhelp countries attractand retainrent‐generating R&D‐
intensive sectors (e.g., Brander and Spencer 1985).
12 At the same time, the
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more internationally mobile. For example, “footloose” R&D may be
able to move more quickly to jurisdictions offering a more favorable
tax regime for R&D (see Wilson [2008] for evidence of this in the U.S.
context). By making it easier to attract R&D, this sharpens the case for
subsidizing science on economic competitiveness grounds.
These arguments are summarized in table 2. In our view, knowledge
spillovers are the strongest argument for R&D subsidies, especially for
basic research compared to applied research. Nonetheless, globalization
has probably weakened the case for such subsidies, whereas it has
strengthened the case for subsidies to applied research. There are two
caveats to this assessment. First, if basic research is complementary to
applied research, then subsidies to basic research could “crowd in”
more applied research. There is evidence on this from the positive local
effects of university research (e.g., Jaffe 1989). But at some point basic
and applied research are substitutes; in terms of federal subsidies, for
example, spending more on one means cutting back funding on the
other. Second, the normative argument for strategic R&D subsidies is
weakened by the fact that other countries may respond to U.S. subsi-
dies with their own subsidies. Countries’ competing in subsidizing
R&D to attract high‐tech firms is like an auction for multinational
R&D. The main winners of this auction are likely to be multinational
companies and their shareholders rather than taxpayers.
The U.S. Position in Innovation
While the U.S. share of world R&D and the science and engineering
workforce have fallen as other countries have invested higher educa-
tion and research, the United States remains the world leader in scien-
tific and technological competence. The United States spends more on
Table 2






















None/little Yes Probably strengthens
rationale
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basic and applied, than any other country. The ratio of R&D to GDP in
the United States is higher than in other major advanced countries ex-
cept for Japan (NSF 2008, app. table 4‐35). Despite the European Union’s
“Lisbon Agenda” push to raise the R&D/GDP ratio to 3%, the large
countries in the European Union continue to fall far short of the U.S.
level of 2.6% in 2005.
European countries have increased government investment in R&D
relative to GDP, but European firms invest a much smaller share of rev-
enues on R&D than U.S. firms, which have raised their R&D budgets
even as the federal government has invested less. Figure 1 shows the
position of R&D performed by business as a proportion of GDP in sev-
eral major countries since 1981. The U.S. business R&D to GDP (BERD)
ratio has remained broadly stable, rising modestly from 1991 (1.5%) to
2006 (1.7%). It exceeds all the other major nations except Japan. In con-
trast, Chinese business R&D has come from nowhere in the 1980s to
over 1% of GDP today. This illustrates both the remarkable catch‐up
by China and the fact that China remains less R&D intensive than the
United States.
How has the United States done in the R&D‐intensive high‐tech in-
dustries? Table 3 shows that from 1980 through 2003 the United States
did well by several measures of innovativeness and production in high
Fig. 1. Business enterprise research and development (BERD) as a percentage of GDP in
selected countries. Source: OECD.
Freeman and Van Reenen 10tech. The share of U.S. Patent Office (USPTO) patent applications going
to first‐named U.S. persons remained roughly constant from 1985 to
2005, whereas the share of European Patent Office (EPO) applications
going to first‐named U.S. persons fell only slightly. In high‐tech manu-
facturing
13 the U.S. share of world gross revenue and of value added
rose during the 1990s boom and remained high through the early
2000s. In the global economy, where firms outsource parts of activities
to different places in the world, the most meaningful measure of U.S.
economic activity relative to other countries is value added. The U.S.
share of world value added in high tech rose from 25% in 1990 to 42%
in 2003.
Where U.S. performance has been less impressive is in the balance of
trade. In 1980 and 1990 the United States ran a large balance of trade
surplus in high tech, which partially counterbalanced the country’s
trade deficit in other goods. The trade balance in high tech turned neg-
ative in 2000 and has gone more negative since, along with the rest of the
country’s balance of trade (Weller and Wheeler 2008).
Since patents and production depend on past scientific advances, it is
possible that the positive picture of U.S. performance in high‐tech
science‐intensive sectors shown in table 3 reflects the advantages of
Table 3
U.S. Shares of USPTO Patents, Shares of World High‐Tech Output,
and Trade Balance in Manufacturing
Measure 1980 1990 2000 2003
U.S. first‐name inventor share USPTO patent applications (%)
* 55 55 56 53
U.S. first‐name inventor share EPO patent applications (%)
* 27 27 26 23
U.S. share of world gross revenue in high tech (%) 28 25 38 39
U.S. share of world value added in high tech (%) 25 25 40 42
U.S. share of world exports in high tech (%) 30 23 18 15
U.S. share of world imports in high tech (%) 13 18 20 17
U.S. trade balance in high tech ($billions) +34 +27 −40 −90
Source: NSF (2008), tables 6.31 and 6.32 for USPTO patent data, tables 6‐41 and 6‐42 for
EPO patent data, tables 6.8 and 6.9 for value added, and tables 6.14 and 6.15 for total
revenue, exports, and imports.
Note: High‐technology manufacturing industries as classified by the OECD include aero-
space, communications equipment, office machinery and computers, pharmaceuticals,
and scientific instruments. Value‐added revenue excludes purchases of domestic and im-
ported materials and inputs. Constant dollar data for foreign countries are calculated by
deflating industry data valued in each country’s nominal domestic currency with a sector‐
specific price index constructed for that country and then converted to U.S. dollars on the
basis of average annual exchange rates.
*Patent statistics refer to 1985 as the first year rather than 1980 and 2005 (USPTO) and
2006 (EPO) as the last year rather than 2003.
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for increased federal R&D spending and the investment in science and
engineering workers is more of a preemptive warning than a response
to any economic disaster. Given that research is exploration of the un-
known with payoffs in the future, this is arguably the appropriate way
to interpret the Competitiveness Initiative and plethora of calls for addi-
tional R&D spending.
II. The NIH Doubling
Background
To see how a potential future rapid increase in R&D spending on the
physical sciences might affect researchers, we examine the 1998–2003
doubling of the NIH research budget and the subsequent deceleration
of NIH funds.
14 Figure 2 displays the level and percentage change in
NIH funds from 1995 through 2007. From 1998 to 2003 the NIH budget
grew by double‐digit amounts in nominal terms, which raised annual
NIH spending from about $14 billion to $27 billion. In constant conumer
price index (CPI) dollars, real research funding increased by 76%. In the
decade prior to the doubling (1987–97), real NIH funding deflated by
the CPI increased by only 40% (NSF 2004, table 1H). Thus the doubling
raised NIH spending by twice as much in 5 years as it had done in the
previous decade. From the Biomedical R&D Price Index (BRDPI),
which rose more rapidly than the CPI, the doubling increased spending
by 66%.
When the doubling ended, the Bush administration recommended a
rapid deceleration in NIH funding, which Congress largely followed.
The rate of increase in spending dropped in nominal terms to 3% in
2004, to 2.2% in 2005, to −0.1% in 2006, and to 0% in 2007. From the
CPI deflator, real NIH spending was 6.6% lower in 2007 than in 2004;
it is expected to fall 13.4% below the 2004 peak by 2009 (Garrison and
McGuire 2008). From the BRDPI deflator, real spending was down
10.9%through2007.ThedropintherealNIHbudgetshockedtheagency
and the bioscience community since it undid much of the extraordinary
increase in funding from the doubling. NIH director Elias Zerhouni said
that even in “the worst scenario, people really didn’t think that the NIH
budget would go below inflation” (quoted in Couzin and Miller 2007,
357). The NIH responded first by reducing the number of grants
awarded and then by reducing the amounts of grants. For the postdoc-
torate researchers trained during the doubling period and for the young
Freeman and Van Reenen 12researchers who obtained their first independent research grants dur-
ing the doubling, the deceleration created a career crisis. For principal
investigators with NIH support, it also posed major problems, as the
probability of continuing a grant and making a successful new applica-
tion fell and as the size of grants shrank. Research labs were pressured
to cut staff. At NIH, which is the single‐largest employer of biomedical
researchers in the country, with over 1,000 principal investigators and
6,000–7,000 mostly PhD researchers, the reduced funding led to a con-
traction in the number of principal investigators by 9%. “A completely
new category of nightmare” was the description given by a researcher
in the National Institute of Child Health and Development, which was
especially hard hit (Science, March 7, 2008, 1324). Others in the scientific
anduniversity community also reacted with dismay or horror. Typical
examples follow:
The marvellous engine of American biomedical research that was
constructed during the last half of the 20th century is being taken
apart, piece by piece. (Robert Weinberg [founder of Whitehead Insti-
tute], Cell 126 [July 14, 2006], 10)
Without effective national policies to recruit young scientists to the
field, and support their research over the long term, in 10 to 15 years,
we’ll have more scientists older than 65 than those younger than 35.
This is not a sustainable trend in biomedical research and must be ad-
dressed aggressively. (NIH Director Zerhouni, http://www.president
.harvard.edu/speeches/faust/080311_NIH.html).
Fig. 2. The acceleration and deceleration of NIH spending under the “doubling goal”
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 13Most of the scientific community views the doubling as having sig-
nificantly increased the rate of biomedical knowledge creation above
what it otherwise would have been. But the effects of the doubling may
have been muted because of the adjustment costs associated with such a
rapid increase (see below). If, moreover, labor supply is inelastic, the in-
crease in funding will show up in the short run in higher wages for scien-
tistsratherthananincreaseinresearch(Goolsbee1998),thoughinthelong
runthehigherwageswillpresumablyattractmoretalentintoscience.Given
the international mobility of scientists, moreover, increased spending is
more likely to prompt migration into the United States of overseas
scientists and postdocs than in the past.
Still, it is hard to find clear evidence that the doubling raised scientific
output. Sachs (2007) noted that the number of biomedical publications
from U.S. labs grew at a steady rate after 1999. The share of U.S. science
and engineering articles in the biological and medical sciences from
1995 to 2005 (NSF 2007a, app. table 5‐36) did not tilt toward these areas
despite their increased share of the nation’s basic research budget.
Using a regression discontinuity design that compared the publications
of scientists who just succeeded in obtaining an NIH grant with the
publications of those who just failed to obtain a grant in the period
1980–2000, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) found only a small impact of re-
ceiving an NIH grant on research output, though one that is larger for
younger than for older scientists. To be sure, without a well‐specified
counterfactual of what would have happened without the doubling
or with some adjustment in the numbers of articles for their quality,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the funding in fact spurred more
and better science. Still, the data are consistent with the notion that by
increasing spending quickly in a short period, NIH did less to increase
scientific production than it might have done if it had increased spend-
ing more evenly over time.
Our analysis highlights two problems with the NIH pattern of in-
creasing R&D spending: the front‐loading of the increase in a short pe-
riod of time and the allocation of the increase between the size and
number of grants and between younger and older researchers. We con-
sider the economics of each problem in turn.
Big Push versus Gradual Change
In general, a rapid acceleration in spending followed by a rapid decel-
e r a t i o ni sa ni n e f f i c i e n tw a yt og e tto a permanently higher level of
Freeman and Van Reenen 14research activity and stock of research scientists. To see why this is so,
we apply the classic accelerator model of investment in physical capital
to increasing R&D. We treat the stock of research by the “perpetual in-
ventory formula” Kt ¼ It þð 1   δÞKt 1, where K is the number of scien-
tists engaged in research, I is the number of newly trained scientists
(postdocs) who enter into research, and δ is the proportion of scientists
who leave research each year for retirement or other reasons. In this
model, Kt is the stock of activity in year t, It is the flow of new activity,
and δ is the depreciation rate. The values of K and I are related to the
number of trained scientists or new scientists by a fraction θ,w h i c h
measures the proportion who work in academia doing basic research.
The rest are engaged in other activities—working in industry or gov-
ernment—or teaching, doing administration, and so on.
In the accelerator model of investment, an increase in the demand for
output induces firms to seek a higher capital stock to meet the new de-
mand. This increases investment spending quickly. When firms reach
the desired capital stock, they reduce the rate of investment sharply.
Analysts of business cycles have long used this model to explain the
greater volatility of investment than of consumption spending that con-
tributes to cyclical fluctuations in the economy. In the case of basic
R&D, assume that society wants to increase the stock of research activ-
ity from KOLD to a new desired level of KNEW. The goal is to increase the
stock of research activity, not to “double” or otherwise increase the flow
of spending. While it may attract public or political support by making
the increase in spending the goal, it is the sustainable stock of research
activity that presumably contributes to national output.
The optimal path to attaining a higher stock depends on the costs of




Peterson 1994; Bond and Van Reenen 2008). We assume that the costs
rise more than proportionately with the size of the change in any period.
Building one new R&D lab involves disruption; building five new labs
a tt h es a m et i m ei sl i k e l yt ob em o r et h a nf i v et i m e sa sd i s r u p t i v e .
15
Many models of adjustment use a quadratic cost curve to measure this
more than proportionate rise in cost. If adjustment costs take any convex
form of this type, the ideal adjustment path is a slow incremental move-
ment to the new desired level. This would mean increasing R&D incre-
mentally to reach KNEW rather than increasing it in a sudden burst.
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 15Figure 3 shows the difference between the optimal relatively smooth
adjustment to the new level of K and adjustment that more closely
mirrors the NIH doubling. At the start of the period, investment is just
equal to the depreciated old capital (e.g., the flow of new postdocs ex-
actly balances the retiring older scientists so that It ¼ δKt 1). The line of
circles shows the ideal increase to the new level KNEW. The line of tri-
angles is closer to what actually happened. The area in between deter-
mines the inefficiency of the system. The inefficiency means that society
could have greater total R&D activity in the long run if it increased
spending more gradually. With quadratic adjustment costs, the ineffi-
ciency can be substantial.
16
The way biomedical research works, with senior scientists running
labs in which postdocs and graduate students perform most of the
hands‐on work, much of the adjustment costs fall onto young research-
ers. An increase in R&D increases the number of postdocs hired and the
number of graduate students that principal investigators seek to attract
to their labs. Parallel to the rapid rise of investment when demand for
output rises in the accelerator model of physical capital, the number of
postdocs/graduate student researchers grows sharply with increased
R&D. The benefits or costs of the adjustment fall disproportionately
Fig. 3. Comparison between doubling research and the socially optimal path of increase.
This compares a stylized version of the doubling of NIH funding to an optimal path
when adjustment costs are convex.
Freeman and Van Reenen 16on the new entrants into the market. On the benefit side, increases in
demand should raise the pay and job opportunities more for new
graduates than for older scientists. On the cost side, young persons
trained during an upsurge in spending will compete with a larger supply
of young biomedical researchers after the upsurge, when there are
likely to be no greater or even fewer independent research opportu-
nities than when they were attracted to the field.
Figure 4A shows that during the doubling period the number of post-
docs increased rapidly whereas the number of principal investigators
barely changed. Figure 4B shows that much of the increase in postdocs
Fig. 4. Increase in the ratio of postdocs to principal investigators in U.S. biomedical
labs and the increase in foreign‐born postdocs compared to U.S. postdocs. A, Postdocs
compared to principal investigators. B, U.S. versus foreign‐born postdocs. Sources: NSF,
Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates
in Science and Engineering (WebCASPAR database: http://webcaspar.nsf.gov), app. table
2‐34; NSF (2008).
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 17during the doubling period came from foreign‐born PhDs, of whom
about half were trained outside the United States.
Even before the doubling there was a sizable increase in the number
of postdocs in the United States. The number of postdocs began increas-
ing rapidly in the early 1980s (Garrison and McGuire 2007, slide 28),
producing a major imbalance between the number working in aca-
demic labs and the number of tenure‐track academic jobs to which they
could aspire. In 1987 the ratio of postdocs to tenured faculty in the life
sciences was 0.54—or approximately one postdoc for every two faculty.
By 1999, the ratio of postdocs to tenured faculty had risen to 0.77. The
s i t u a t i o nd i dn o tc h a n g em u c hi nt he doubling period. The number
of full‐time senior faculty in the life sciences grew by 13% (NSF 2008,
app. table 5‐19) and the number of postdocs in biological sciences
grew by 18% (NSF 2007b, table 49). In the 1970s about three‐quarters
of postdocs obtained academic jobs, but no more than 20%–30% of the
increased number in the 2000s can expect positions in academic re-
search. The vast bulk of postdocs will end up in nonacademic research
jobs. The slowdown of NIH spending after the doubling led to effec-
tively no growth for either senior faculty or postdocs.
In sum, the rapid acceleration and deceleration of NIH spending cre-
ated problems for researchers and potential researchers. In consider-
ing any future increases in federal support for basic research, policy
makerscouldfocusontherateofscientificactivityrelativetoGDPrather
than on increasing the rate of spending over a short period. The most
efficient policy is to move slowly to the desired level of R&D, minimiz-
ing as far as possible adjustment costs, rather than following a “feast
then famine” spending policy. In our conclusion we offer some sugges-
tions as to how to do this in a world in which Congress sets budgets
annually.
Internal Organization of Biomedical Research
At the heart of the American biomedical science enterprise are the R01
grants that the NIH gives to fund individual scientists and their teams
of postdoctorate employees and graduate students. The system of fund-
ing individual researchers on the basis of unsolicited applications for
research support comes close enough to economists’ views of how a
decentralized market mechanism operates to suggest that this ought
to be an efficient way to conduct research compared, say, to some cen-
tral planner mandating research topics. The individual researchers
choose the most promising line of research on the basis of “local
Freeman and Van Reenen 18knowledge” of their special field. They submit proposals to fund-
ing agencies, where panels of experts—“study sections” in the NIH
world—give independent peer review, ranking proposals in accordance
with criteria set out by funding agencies and their perceived quality.
Finally, the agency funds as many proposals with high rankings that it
can within its budget constraints.
On the funding side, there is also competition. There are nongovern-
ment funders such as the Howard Hughes Foundation, a major sup-
porter of independent researchers, and many medical foundations
focused on particular diseases or issues, as well as the NSF and other
government agencies. The NIH itself, moreover, is a diverse institution
with a variety of programs, institutes, and centers that make their own
research support decisions. With many groups seeking to support re-
searchand many scientists seeking support for their research, the level
of competition would seem to be sufficiently broad and wide to yield
good economic outcomes.
Still, in the market for biomedical research, NIH is the 800‐pound
gorilla. For most academic bioscientists, winning an NIH R01 grant is
critical to their research careers. It gives young scientists the opportunity
toruntheirownlabratherthantoworkinthelabofaseniorresearcheror
to have to abandon research entirely. For scientists who have an NIH
grant, winning a continuation grant is often an implicit criterion for ob-
taining tenure at a research university.
Table 4 provides a statistical overview of the RO1 granting process
from 1980, when it was relatively easy for biomedical scientists to obtain
grant support, through the 1998–2003 doubling period and through
Table 4
Applications, Awards, and Success Rates for RO1 and Equivalent Grants,
by Status of Applicant
1980 1998 2003 2006 2007
Potential first‐time awardees:
Applications 8,515 6,817 8,377 9,399 …
Awards 1,903 1,484 1,720 1,384 1,663
Success rate 22.3 21.3 20.5 14.7 …
% of successful with original proposal 86 61 49 34 28
% of successful with first amendment 13 29 38 40 41
Experienced (previously funded) applicants:
Applications 7,404 13,666 16,325 19,822 …
Awards 3,240 4,782 5,730 4,677
Success rate (%) 43.8 35.0 35.1 23.6
Source: http://grants.nih.gov/grants/new_investigators/Workforce_Info09072007.ppt
(09‐7‐2007), app. A table.
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 192007. It presents data for two groups of applicants for research awards.
The first group consists of “potential new awardees”—researchers who
had not previously applied for an NIH grant.
17 Because postdocs rarely
apply for the RO1s, potential first‐time awardees are primarily newly
hired assistant professors in research universities.
18 The second group
consists of experienced researchers, those who had previously been
funded by NIH. They may be applying for a continuation grant or pos-
sibly a new grant to undertake a project that differs from what they had
been working on.
In 1980 the agency received more applications from potential new
awardees than from experienced researchers but gave more awards
to previous awardeesthan to new investigators. It funded 44% of experi-
enced applications versus 22% of applications from new investigators.
As the stock of researchers increased in the 1980s and 1990s, the number
of submissions from previous awardees increased. By 1998 the agency
had fewer submissions and gave fewer awards to new researchers than
in 1980, whereas it had more submissions and gave more grants to ex-
perienced researchers.
During the doubling period, the number of applications from both
potential new awardees and experienced researchers increased signifi-
cantly, and the NIH gave more grants to both. The deceleration in the
funding of the NIH produced a sizable drop in the number of grants
awarded from 2003 to 2006 even as the number of submissions in-
creased, again with the percentage changes being larger for the potential
awardees. In 2006 the NIH trimmed the amounts it gave for continu-
ing grants by 2.35% despite inflation and used the funds saved to in-
crease the number of grants to new researchers, though the number
of awards still remained below the number in 2003. It did this in an
effort to keep new researchers with high‐quality proposals in research
activity.
The rows in table 4 referring to success rates of potential first‐time
awardees with their original proposal or with a first amendment show
another change in the research process: a marked drop in the percentage
of applicants who gain a grant with their original submission.
19 In 1980,
55% of awardees who succeeded in gaining support did so on their first
submissioncomparedto28%ofawardeesin2007.Increasingly,research-
ers gain awards after amending the submission to meet with objections
or suggestions of the panel that reviewed their proposal. The sum of the
percentages for success with the original proposal and the first amend-
ment also drops over time, implying that the NIH asked for second or
Freeman and Van Reenen 20third submissions before giving a grant. This means that projects were
delayed for perhaps a year.
While it is common to refer to new RO1 awardees as “young re-
searchers,” the term is a misnomer. Because R01s generally go to scien-
tists who are assistant professors or higher in their rank and the length
of postdoctorate jobs has grown over time, the average age of a new re-
cipient was 42.9 in 2005, up from 35.2 in 1970 and 37.3 in the mid‐1980s.
According to the numbers in figure 5, in 1980, 22% of grants went to
scientists 35 and younger, but the proportion trended downward so
that in 2005, just 3% of grants went to scientists 35 and younger. By con-
trast, the proportion of grants going to scientists 45 and older increased
from 22% to 77% of R01s. Within the 45 and older group, the largest
gainers were scientists aged 55 and older.
Part of this change is associated with an aging of the science work-
f o r c e ,b u tm o s to fi ti sd u et ot h ec h a n g i n go r g a n i z a t i o no fr e s e a r c h ,
which gives older investigators substantive advantages in obtaining
funding and places younger researchers as postdocs in their labs. When
we take account of the distribution of PhD bioscientists by age, the rel-
ative odds of a younger scientist gaining an NIH grant compared to
someone 45 and older dropped over 10‐fold. We do not attribute this
pattern to the doubling of research moneys since it reflects a longer‐
run trend. But we note that the NIH did not use the extra moneys to
improve career prospects for graduate students or postdocs. The result
is considerable malaise among graduate students and postdocs in the
life sciences as well as among senior scientists concerned with the
Fig. 5. Number of persons younger than 35 years old getting RO1s
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 21health of their field (NRC 1998; NAS 2005; American Academy of Arts
and Sciences 2008).
Research Grants for Younger Scientists?
Should the country be concerned about the small, declining share of
grant moneys that goes to younger scientists and to the increased
numberof years that it takes them to obtain independent research sup-
port? In terms of economic analysis, there are three reasons for believ-
ing that the concentration of research support on older scientists has
deleterious effects on research productivity.
The first is the possibility that scientists are more creative and pro-
ductive at younger ages. Measured by numbers of papers, there is evi-
dence that productivity falls with age in at least some fields (Lehman
1953; Zuckerman and Merton 1973; Simonton 1988; Levin and Stephan
1991) and that productivity in research institutes is lower when the
average age of researchers is higher (Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2003). Jones
(2005) finds that major breakthroughs in science and innovations oc-
cur primarily when scientists or inventors are in their 30s or 40s, but
that in recent years the greater investment in knowledge to get to
the frontier has meant that the age at which people make their great
contributions has increased. To the extent that younger scientists are
more likely to undertake breakthrough research when they have their
o w ng r a n ts u p p o r tr a t h e rt h a nw h e nt h e yw o r ka sp o s t d o c si nt h el a b s
of senior investigators and are more likely to undertake such work
than older scientists, concentrating research support on the older group
reduces the productivity of research and the payoff from government
funding.
20
The second reason is that supporting scientists earlier in their careers
will increase the pecuniary attractiveness of science and engineering to
young persons choosing their life’s work. It will do this because the
normal discounting of future returns makes money and opportunities
received earlier more valuable than money and opportunities received
later. If students who consider science careers had a better chance to
become independent investigators in their 30s rather than in their 40s
or 50s, we would expect the number who chose science to be higher
than it is today.
21
The third reason relates to the likely use of new knowledge uncov-
ered by researchers. A research project creates two outputs. It produces
research findings that are public information. But it also increases the
Freeman and Van Reenen 22human capital of the researcher, who knows better than anyone else the
new outcomes and who probably has better ideas of how to apply them
to future research or other activities than other persons. Assume that an
older researcher and a younger researcher are equally productive and
accrue the same additional knowledge and skills from a research proj-
ect. Then because the younger person will have more years to use the
new knowledge, the social payoff from funding the younger person
will be higher than from funding the older person. Just as human capi-
tal theory says that people should invest in education when they are
younger because they have more years to reap the returns than if they
invested when they are older, this line of thinking implies that it would
be better to award research grants to younger scientists than to other-
wise comparable older scientists.
In sum, economic analysis lends some support to the views of the
scientific community that society would likely get more “bang for its
research buck” if the internal structure of research funding was more
favorable to younger researchers than it is.
III. Funding Agency and Researcher Behavior
Funding agencies and researchers interact in the market for research
grants. An agency with a given budget must decide how to allocate
the budget between the number of grants and the sizes of grants, pre-
sumably with the goal of maximizing research output. Should it give
fewer large grants or more small grants? Should it favor new research
submissions, whether from younger or experienced researchers, or con-
tinuance of existing grants from experienced researchers? The effect of
these decisions on research output depends in turn on how researchers
respond to changes in the dollar value and number of potential research
awards.
Table 5 shows that during the doubling, NIH increased the average
value and number of awards, particularly for new submissions (which
includes new projects proposed by experienced researchers as well as
projects by new investigators). With the success rate of awards stable at
roughly 25%—a proportion that the agency views as desirable to sup-
port on the basis of the quality of proposals—the number of awards
increased proportionately to the number of submissions.
From 2003 to 2006, when the budget contracted in real terms, the
NIH maintained the value of awards in real terms and reduced the
number of new awards by 20%. With the number of new submissions
growing, the result was a large drop in the success rate. In 2007, the
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new awards. The data on continuation grants for existing projects show
a similar pattern: increases in the number and amount awarded during
the period of doubling and reductions in numbers awarded rel-
ative to submissions afterward.
Although its budget increased more modestly in the early and mid‐
2000s, the NSF faced similar decisions regarding the allocation of
budgets between the number and average size of awards (amount
per year and duration) and betweenn e wa n dp r e v i o u s l yf u n d e di n -
vestigators. Responding to a 2001 Office of Management and Budget
concern that NSF researchers spent too much time writing grant propo-
sals instead of doing research, the NSF decided to increase the amount of
research awards while holding fixed or reducing the number of awards.
Giving larger grants to a smaller proportion of researchers would, in the
NSF’s eyes, “minimize the time [principal investigators] would spend
writing multiple proposals and managing administrative tasks, provid-
ing increased stability for supporting graduate students” (NSF 2007a, 5).
Table 6 shows that, consistent with this, the NSF increased the mean
dollar value of awards from 1997 to 2006 by 72% (from $78,223 to
$134,595) compared to a 13% increase in the number of awards. The
Table 5
TheReducedChanceofGettingNIHR01GrantsandtheIncreasedNumberofSubmissions
Needed to Get an NIH Grant
1997 2003 2006 2007
New submissions:
Submissions 14,814 18,738 22,150 20,651
Awards 3,476 4,526 3,612 3,961
Success rate (%) 23.5 24.2 16.3 19.2
Success rate for original submission (%) 18.7 17.0 7.9 8.4
Proportion winning on original submission (%) 55 51 32 28
Average number of submissions per award 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1
Average value of award $217,348 $345,426 $359,911 $382,782
Continuation grants:
Submissions 5,510 5,785 6,830 6,586
Awards 2,624 2,858 2,388 2,468
Success rate (%) 47.6 49.4 35.0 37.5
Success rate for original submission (%) 47.5 40.2 25.7 25.2
Proportion winning on original submission (%) 44 61.8 41.8 36.8
Average number of submissions per award 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9
Average value of award $261,662 $357,103 $374,288 $386,507
Source: Office of Extramural Research, NIH, “Success Rates for NIH Type 1 Competing
ResearchProjectApplications”(http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/success.htm),Excel
file, by amendment status.
Freeman and Van Reenen 24number of research proposals grew rapidly over the period, presum-
ably in part because of the increased dollar value of awards, but also
possibly because of the greater ease of submitting proposals through
the NSF’s fast‐track system. In any case, the success rate for funding
dropped from 30% to 21%, which our analysis suggests would spur ad-
ditional applications. In 2006, the NSF funded 62% of highly rated pro-
posals, whereas in 1997 it had funded 76% of such proposals. Proposals
that were highly rated but ultimately declined represented $2 billion in
requested research support in 2006 (NSF 2007a).
How did researchers respond to these changes in the allocation of
funds between amounts and numbers? What can we learn from those
responses to guide agency decisions about the division of any future
large increase in R&D spending and the inevitable ensuing deceleration
in the rate of spending?
Researchers responded to the NIH doubling by submitting more pro-
posals to the agency. While NSF spending increased more modestly in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the NSF saw an increase in proposals as
well. Given higher grant awards and the increased numbers of awards
(withroughlyconstantfundingrates),thegrowthofsubmissionsreflects
standard economic supply behavior: positive responses to the incentive
of more and higher‐valued research awards. What about responses to
declines in research support?
If researchers submitted a single proposal to agencies, we would
e x p e c tr e d u c e dn u m b e r so rs i z e so fa w a r d st h a tl o w e rt h ee x p e c t e d
value of a submission to lead them to make fewer submissions. But
the fact that researchers can submit more than one proposal to fund-
ing agencies alters their potential supply behavior, at least in the short
run. Some researchers could submit more proposals in periods of
l o wn u m b e r so fa w a r d si nt h eh o p eo fi m p r o v i n gt h ec h a n c et h e yw i l l
gain at least one award and thus be able to continue their research
work.
Table 6
National Science Foundation Research Proposals and Awards, 1997–2006
1997 2006
Competitive proposals 19,935 31,514
Competitive awards 5,961 6,708
Funding rate 30% 21%
Proposal submitted per principal investigator receiving one award 1.7 2.2
Average mean award size $78,223 $134,595
Source: NSF (2007a, figs. 2–4).
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bling period. The average number of submissions per new award
granted and per continuation awards granted rose sharply from 2003
to 2007 after changing only modestly during the doubling period. By
2007, NIH awardees were putting in roughly two proposals to get
an award. Data in the table on the proportion winning awards on an
original proposal tell a similar story: fewer investigators gaining awards
on original proposals, inducing them to amend proposals in response
to peer review reports to increase their chances of gaining a research
grant.
The data for the NSF in table 6 tell a similar story. The number of
research proposals submitted per principal investigator before re-
ceiving one award increased by 1.7 in 1998–2000 to 2.2 in 2004–6.
The statistics underlying the averages in the table show that the pro-
portion of principal investigator awardees making a single submis-
sion dropped from 59% to 51%, whereas the proportion of principal
investigators making three or more submissions increased from
18% to 26%. The notion that by giving fewer large grants the
NSF would reduce the time spent writing multiple rewards turned
outtobelargelywrong.Facedwiththeriskoflosingsupportandclos-
ing or contracting their labs, principal investigators made multiple
submissions.
In appendix B we present a simple model of researcher behavior con-
sistentwiththisformofbehavior.Themodelgivesresearcherstheoption
ofsubmittingzero,one,ortwoproposalstoafundingagency.Weassume
that each researcherwantsonlya single grantto conduct hisorher work.
In this situation, the very best researchers submit one application (since
they are virtually assured of getting support), but some researchers
choose to submit two proposals because they judge their chances of
winning as lower but still above the costs of developing a proposal. A
third group decides against making a proposal. When the value of
awards increases, a larger proportion of scientists make bids and a
larger number make two bids, and conversely when the value of
awards decreases. The interesting behavior occurs when the number
of awards granted changes. An increase in the number of awards in-
creases the number of researchers who apply as the chances of winning
increase.Butwhenthenumberofawardsdecreases,themodelsaysthat
it is likely that a larger proportion of applicants will put in two bids.
Some highly able scientists make additional proposals because they
are uncertain that they will gain an award and maintain their lab. The
Freeman and Van Reenen 26result is an increase in the average number of proposals from research-
erswhoultimatelygainanawardandaresearchgrantprocessthatcon-
sumes a larger fraction of researchers’ time. In addition, the increased
proportion of potential grantees writing multiple grants means that
they have less time to peer‐review the proposals of their colleagues.
T h i sp u t sas t r a i no nt h ew h o l es y s t e m .
Itispossiblethatthisprocessbyitselfdiscouragessomeyoungpersons
from going on in science. Who wants to spend time writing proposal
after proposal with modest probabilities of success? It may also lead
to more conservative science, as researchers shy away from the big re-
search questions in favor of manageable topics that fit with prevailing
fashion and gain support from study groups.
While our analysis deals with only some of the decisions facing re-
search granting agencies and researchers, it highlights a key point
about the research process: that funding agencies need good knowledge
of the likely behavior of researchers to allocations of funds in order to
get the most research from their budgets. Conceptually, there is an op-
timal division of budgets between numbers and values of awards and
between new and continuing grantees that depends on the response of
researchers. From NIH experience with the doubling and ensuing cut-
back in funds and NSF experience with increasing the size of awards
while barely changing the numbers, the agencies have presumably
learned enough about researcher behavior that they would respond
differently to future increases in R&D budgets than they have in the
past.
IV. Conclusions
This study directs attention to how policy makers might best undertake
any future sizable increase in R&D spending, of the type envisaged for
the physical sciences by the American Competitiveness Initiative. We
have noted that globalization affects traditional justifications for gov-
ernment funding of R&D as a public good. Increasing spillovers of
knowledge across national borders reduces the ability of any country
to recoup the benefits of basic R&D and thus weakens the public‐good
argument for greater U.S. spending.B u ta tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eg r e a t e r
international mobility of high‐tech research‐intensive industries that
are drawn by strong basic research in an area argues for larger support
of basic R&D than in the past. We have made no effort to quantify these
two effects.
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beseen in termsof increasingthe stock ofsustainable activity ratherthan
in attaining some arbitrary target (i.e., doubling) in a short period. There
are virtues to a smooth approach to higher (or lower) levels of spend-
ing, which are particularly important for R&D, as distinct from most
other forms of investment, because it takes considerable time to build
up human capital, which then has a potentially long period of return.
Since Congress determines budgets annually, the question becomes
how either the Congress can commit to a more stable spending goal or
how agencies and universities can offset large changes in funding from
budget to budget.
We have two suggestions here. The first would be for research grants
to contain an extra “stabilization” overhead with the stipulation that
universities or other research institutions place those payments into
a stabilization fund to provide bridge support for researchers when
R&D spending levels off. The second is to assign some of the R&D
tax credits that boost applied research to a basic research fund that
wouldprovidesmoothfundingforbasicresearch.Thereisconsiderable
evidence that fiscal incentives for R&D affect firm’sR & Db e h a v i o r .
22
On the basis of current evidence, however, it is difficult to assess the
outcome of these two suggested ways to change the mode of funding
basic research.
Third, our analysis highlights the importance of funding agency de-
cisions about the division of research budgets between younger and
older researchers and between numbers of awards and sizes of awards.
Because younger investigators have longer careers than equally compe-
tent older investigators over which to use the newly created knowledge,
human capital analysis gives a reason to tilt grant spending toward
younger scientists. In addition, given multiple applications and the
overstretch of the peer review system, it might increase efficiency for
agencies to add program officers and find ways to deal more effica-
ciously with proposals, as indeed both the NIH and the NSF have begun
to do.
In sum, if there is to be a new surge in research budgets, there are
pitfalls to avoid from the NIH doubling experience and different ways
agencies could allocate funds that might get more research output for
the dollars spent. Additional research funding spent more efficaciously
could attract and retain the young scientists on whom future progress
depends and improve the flow of the new science that can help the U.S.
economy and contribute to the solution of the diverse problems that
threaten global well‐being.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Modeling Researcher Responses to Short‐Run Changes in Numbers
of Awards: A Simple Model of Scientist Behavior
A. Individual Behavior
There are a pool of L potential researchers who submit either zero, one,
or two research bids.
23 If they submit, they have a probability p of win-
ning an award. This will be a function of researcher quality, z, and the
numberofawardsmadeavailablebythegovernment,N,sop ¼ fðz, N, Þ
and is increasing in both arguments. Let us assume that the support of
the distribution of researcher quality is [0, 1]. A researcher is allowed
to accept a maximum of only one award at a time (so if he wins two,
he can take only one). Winning an award gives value to the researcher
(funds) of V, and losing is normalized to zero. The cost of putting a bid
together is c.
The net utility of submitting one bid is uð1Þ:
24
uð1Þ¼pV   c:
The net utility of submitting two bids is uð2Þ:
uð2Þ¼½ 1  ð 1   pÞ
2 V   2c ¼ pð2   pÞV   2c:
A scientist will not submit a bid if uð1Þ < 0, that is, p < c=V.
Define the benefit‐cost ratio as β ¼ V=c and the threshold probability
as p e ¼ 1=β. Thus if p < p e, the researcher will choose not to bid.
Table A2










2007 $21,263,805,742 47,181 $20,415,899,325
2006 $23,182,959,918 46,797 $20,154,363,154
2005 $23,410,118,044 47,345 $20,206,478,806
2004 $22,900,576,587 47,464 $19,607,812,023
2003 $21,866,798,411 46,081 $18,461,462,170
2002 $19,074,464,796 43,520 $16,830,194,185
2001 $16,784,681,877 40,666 $14,907,921,291
2000 $14,791,024,329 38,302 $13,002,656,762
1999 $12,855,628,060 35,870 $11,228,665,952
1998 $11,179,749,719 33,703 $9,801,789,027
1997 $10,456,030,704 32,109 $9,046,542,619
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This condition can be written as
  βp2 þ βp   1 > 0:




















   s "#
subject to the regularity conditions that the value of β must allow p to
be defined on the (0, 1) support (e.g., β > 4).
These three thresholds define scientist behavior over four regimes
(see fig. B1):
A. p < p e: researcher will bid zero.
B. p e < p < p: researcher will make one bid.
C. p < p <
‐ p : researcher will make two bids.
D.
‐ p < p: researcher will make one bid.
The intuition is the following. In regime A, the probability of winning
is too low to cover the costs (in expected terms). In regime D, “star scien-
tist,” the probability of winning is so high that there is not much benefit
from a second bid. In regime C, the chances of winning are not quite so
high, so the researcher finds that it pays to take out a second ticket. In
regime B, it is worth making a bid, but because these scientists are on
the margin (“marginal quality”) of not bidding, they do not find that it
is worth the cost of two bids.
Comparative statics in β. If the value of the award rises (β up), then
this will change the thresholds: p e will fall, p will fall, and
‐ p will rise. This
Fig. B1. General model. The term p is the probability of winning an award; the three
cutoff probabilities define the thresholds. See the text for details.
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Since p and M are now endogenous, we must solve the model in terms of
the exogenous variables z and N. We can define thresholds analogous to
p e, p, and
‐ p in the space of researcher quality (z e, z, and
‐ z). These can be
written as functions of the benefit‐cost ratio, β, and the numberof poten-
tial awards.
Comparative statics in β. If the number of awards falls, all the thresh-
olds shift to the right. The probability of winning a bid will fall, so fewer
scientists will submit any bids. Similarly, if the number of awards rises,
then the thresholds shift to the left and there are more bids.
In terms of the numbers making two bids, this depends on the func-
tional forms and the magnitude of the change in N. The following seems
like a reasonable description of the doubling and postdoubling period,
however. During the doubling period the thresholds all shift to the left,
but the proportion of (potential L) scientists in regime C who make two
bids stays the same (
‐ z   z).
Compare this to the postdoubling period. We keep
‐ z   z the same,
but all thresholds have moved to the right, so there is a smaller margin
of scientists in regime D. This means that of all the winning bids, the
proportion of scientists submitting two bids has increased; that is,
ð
‐ z   zÞ=ð1   z eÞ is larger.
The intuition is clear. During the postdoubling period, many of the
“star scientists” during the doubling period can no longer feel confident
in winning an award, so they put in two bids to increase their prob-
ability of a successful draw.
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1. An alternative to broad‐based incentives to increase supply would be for
military and defense sectors to attract more U.S. citizen scientists and engineers
by raising their pay, which would reallocate more citizens to those jobs even if
the number of U.S.‐born scientists did not change.
2. Indicative of the concern and pressure to increase the national investment
in science, in the first week of May 2008, 450 educators, lobbyists, government
officials, and business leaders met in Washington to keep the issue and Com-
petitiveness Initiative in the forefront of policy makers (Mervis 2008).
3. According to NSF (2007b, table 2), the United States spent $63.6 billion on
basic research in 2006, and $36.9 billion was in colleges and universities, of
which $24.5 billion was funded by the federal government (66%; http://
www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf07331/pdf/tab2.pdf).
4. U.S. R&D increased by 6% in 2006 according to NSF projections (NSF
2007b), projected; 1990 figures from NSF (1995).
5. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) show that there are clusters of biotech-
nology activity around “star researchers” in nearby universities. Similarly, U.S.
states with greater supplies of university graduates have been in the forefront
of the “new economy” (Progressive Policy Institute 2002). For evidence on the
aggregate impact of R&D on productivity, see Griliches (1998) and Jones and
Williams (1998).
6. Earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers in the three highly
R&D‐intensive sectors—aerospace, chemicals, and computers and electronic
products—averaged $20.00 per hour compared to $15.97 per hour for produc-
tion and nonsupervisory workers in the country as a whole (http://www.bls
.gov/web/empsit.supp.toc.htm#historical).
7. The idea that other parts of the value chain locate close to R&D is wide-
spread. This may be much less true in today’s more globalized world since the
value chain can increasingly be disaggregated. For example, in pharmaceuti-
cals, drug discovery may occur in the United States, but clinical trials may be
located in eastern Europe and drug manufacturing in India.
8. There may be other market failure justifications, such as imperfections in fi-
nancial markets.
9. For a classic survey, see Griliches (1992); for more recent evidence, see Bloom,
Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2006).
10. See Keller (2004) for a survey and Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen
(2006) for recent evidence.
11. More generally, the rationale for country support depends on the relative
rate of diffusion of knowledge within a country and across countries. If diffu-
sion rates increase proportionately, the social vs. private margin for national
investments would be stable.
12. Convincing empirical evidence of the quantitative importance of these
strategic R&D competitions is rare. Those that have studied it generally find
that the strategic R&D competition effect is dwarfed by the knowledge spill-
overs effect (e.g., Bloom et al. 2006).
13. This is defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) to include aerospace, communications equipment, office ma-
chinery and computers, pharmaceuticals, and scientific instruments.
14. The experience of the NIH doubling is more relevant to a future increase in
R&D than the doubling of federal R&D spending following the Sputnik. In that
Freeman and Van Reenen 34periodthesupplyofscienceandengineeringworkerswasprimarilydomestic,so
that the increase raised salaries greatly, inducing more native students to enter
the field and increase supply in the future (Freeman 1975). Today, with the inter-
national market in science and engineering workers, supply is more elastic so
that increased spending will likely have a greater impact on quantities than
wages.
15. Adjustment costs come in many forms. They include the construction of
new R&D labs, recruitment and training of new staff, and systemwide adjust-
ment costs, which we discuss shortly.
16. If R&D spending were mainly an irreversible fixed cost, then the optimal
adjustment path in fig. 3 would not be smooth adjustment, but rather a sudden
shift closer to the actual change. This is unlikely to be a good description of
adjustment costs, however, especially at the aggregate level. Also note that
our analysis ignores any possible advantage to producing new research earlier
than later beyond the standard discounting of future benefits, for instance,
through spillovers over time that improve the productivity of future research.
If there are such gains, they must eventually suffer from diminishing returns so
that rising adjustment costs dominate the calculation on the margin where the
decision about funding is made.
17. Applicants are considered new investigators if they have not previously
served as the principal investigators on any Public Health Service–supported
research project other than a small grant (R03), an Academic Research Enhance-
mentAward(R15),anexploratory/developmentalgrant(R21),orcertainresearch
career awards directed principally to physicians, dentists, or veterinarians at the
beginning of their research career (K01, K08, and K12). Current or past recipients
of Independent Scientist and other nonmentored career awards (K02, K04) are
not considered new investigators.
18. While the NIH has no restriction against postdocs applying for research
grants, its Web site states that “before you seek an independent research grant,
[you should] Hold a Ph.D. or M.D. Have a faculty‐level position, usually assis-
tant professor or higher. Have a publication record in the field in which you are
applying. Work in a research institution that will provide the resources, e.g.,
equipment and lab space, you will need to complete the project. … You will also
need preliminary data for an R01” (http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/
new/new06.htm). Universities have general rules guiding the level of investiga-
tor that may apply for independent funding and about the resources they will
provide to help in the grant process.
19. Much like journals, study groups can choose to accept or reject new sub-
missions outright or ask for a revision of the original submission.
20. But there is no analysis of whether working in someone else’s lab affects
productivity nor that older scientists with the same productivity as younger
scientists in fact make less use of the knowledge created. The faster knowledge
changes in a field, the less importance the shorter future working life of older
scientists will have on the probability that they will use this knowledge less
than younger scientists. In addition, there may be offsetting factors beyond hu-
man capital considerations that argue in favor of older scientists, for instance, if
older scientists transmitted their knowledge more rapidly to students than
younger scientists dids.
21. Freeman (2005) and Freeman, Chang, and Chiang (2005) show substantial
responsiveness of young persons to NSF Graduate Research Fellowships. It is
hard to imagine that if they offered $30,000 awards 20 years into the future,
they would apply for the fellowships as much as they have.
R&D Spending on the Physical Sciences 3522. See Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) for international evidence or
Hall and Van Reenen (2001) for a survey focusing on U.S. evidence. Hall (1993) ex-
amines policy in the 1980s.
23. For simplicity we cap the maximum number of bids at two but consider a
larger number of bids in the extensions below.
24. The model assumes risk neutrality. If we incorporate risk aversion, the
same basic intuitions come through.
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